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THE IMPACT OF PSYCHIATRY UPON
JURISPRUDENCE
HAROLD D. LASSWELL*
In recent years the long history of the effects of psychiatry upon
jurisprudential thinking and upon legal systems have been re-examined
with exceptional diligence. These contributions render it opportune to
reconsider the present-day significance of psychiatry for systematic
thinking about law.'
Psychiatric knowledge is in some ways distinctive. (1) We rely
upon it for much of our current understanding of how some extremes
of thought and behavior are immediately dependent upon organic
factors. (2) We owe to psychiatric research our present awareness
of the pervasive role of unconscious factors in shaping human re-
sponse. (3) Psychiatry has devised methods for the study and treat-
ment of extreme contitions, some of which can be transferred to the
preventive strategy of everyday life. (4) Psychiatric science has pro-
foundly affected the social and psychological sciences by calling atten-
tion to the subtler interplay of the growth of individual personality
and the character of the social context to which each person is ex-
posed. We have learned the finer structure of culture, class, interest,
and personality at various levels of crisis as a side effect of modern
psychiatry.'
The tasks of jurisprudence are various since this discipline is
related to legal institutions in ways that correspond to the relation of
economics to economic institutions. Economics and jurisprudence
provide language about their fields of inquiry; they are not the
language of these fields. When the vocabulary of a given legal system
creeps into a system of jurisprudence it is essential to disregard the
meanings found in legal convention and to follow the meanings
chosen for the distinctive purposes of jurisprudence. These aims are
in no sense exclusively academic. All active participants in adjudica-
tion, arbitrartion, legislation, and related operations of a conventional
Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale School of Law.
1 All the volumes originally given as Isaac Ray Lectures under the auspices of the
American Psychiatric Association may be cited in this connection.
2 Research is moving ahead so rapidly that it is necessary to keep in touch, not
with textbooks, but with articles in the principal journals. Concerning the impact of
psychoanalysis and other developments in psychiatry upon law and other disciplines,
see Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences (Roheim ed. 1947); Lasswell, "Impact of
Psychoanalytic Thinking on the Social Sciences," The State of the Social Sciences, (White
ed. 1956); Psychiatry and Law (Hock and Lubin ed. for The American Psychopatho-
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legal order achieve a "working jurisprudence" of their own. They
learn, for instance, which judges are likely to apply doctrines and
statutes differently. One function of jurisprudence is to make prac-
tical wisdom articulate and to subject it to critical evaluation in the
light of the goals of the public order as a whole.
1.
The present discussion moves within the context of a policy-
oriented jurisprudence.' A jurisprudence of this kind locates law
within the social process as a whole. Law is most usefully understood
as part of the decision process. Decisions are sanctioned choices; or,
to be more precise, choices enforcible, if necessary, by the use of
severe deprivations. By conceiving the province of law as authorita-
tive and controlling decision we emancipate the conception of law
from the ignominy of referring exclusively to words, or the absurdity
of serving as a label for every act of power.
The generalizations of jurisprudence can be put in two chief
categories: principles of content; principles of procedure. If we
postulate the goal of a given legal process as the realization of human
dignity, for instance, the principle is in the category of content. If
we go further and specify that human dignity is to be understood as
the optimum participation by individuals in the shaping and sharing
of all values in the social process, we are still referring to the content
of what decision makers should think about. If we say that all prob-
lems confronting a decision maker should be approached by the de-
liberate, successive and interacting use of five tools of thought, we
are enunciating a basic principle of procedure, since we are consider-
ing the order in which the mind of a decision maker can best bring
various kinds of content to the focus of his attention. More inclusively
stated, we are formulating a principle of "spiral" (successive) exam-
ination of a problem in terms of goal, trend, condition, projection,
and alternative.
It is apparent that policy-oriented jurisprudence is open to in-
fluence from the field of psychiatry at many points. How, for example,
shall we specify the goal of human dignity in meaningful terms if one
of the chief emphases in psychiatric knowledge is upon chemical fac-
tors that affect the subjectivities and behaviors of the individual, and
upon the unconscious residues of childhood development? If we turn
from questions relating to goal and ask about trend, we look to psy-
chiatric research for means of assessing trends in the degree of free-
3 A recent statement by M. S. McDougal is "Perspectives for an International Law
of Human Dignity," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 107
(Presidential address 1959).
[Vol. 21
PSYCHIATRY AND JURISPRUDENCE
dom enjoyed by individual members of a body politic. Similarly, in
regard to conditioning factors, it is from psychiatry that we draw the
data and methods by which to assess the impact of organic or uncon-
scious components. All projections of future development, and all
alternatives of policy, depend to a degree upon such knowledge.
2.
Jurisprudence is concerned with providing tools appropriate to
the examination of public order systems as a whole and of any specific
detail, such as a given controversy, within the whole; we speak of
public order as a system of human relationships which are sought to
be protected and perfected through the legal order.4 The legal order
comprises the decision process in so far as it is authoritative and con-
trolling. Phrasing the conception of public order more formally, it
refers to the basic patterns of value shaping and sharing, and the
fundamental institutional practices, which are sought to be protected
and fulfilled through the legal components of the decision process.
In applying this conception to the United States, for example,
it is possible to say that the proclaimed goal of American society,
which is realized in part, is widespread rather than narrow participa-
tion in the shaping and sharing of all values. Among the basic institu-
tions specialized to the decision process (power value) we name
federalism, the tri-partite separation of powers, and the protection of
individual rights. American economic institutions which receive various
degrees of legal protection include relatively great freedom of con-
tract, and broad scope for the private ownership and management of
resources for profit-making purposes. The American respect (social
class) system is, in proclaimed theory, based upon non-discrimination
and the recognition of individual merit. The system of enlightenment
includes widespread reliance upon private initiative in the gathering,
dissemination and use of information and estimates relating to specific
incidents or to the factual context as a whole. The institutions relating
to occupational, professional and artistic skill embrace all the schools
and associate activities specialized to the transmission of know-how,
and the setting and application of general standards of excellence.
Institutions specialized to rectitude, like churches, emphasize the for-
mulation, justification, and application of standards of responsible
conduct, and the transmission thereof. American institutions relating
to affection (family, friends) emphasize freedom in the choice of one
partner at a time (serialized monogamy). Institutions relating to
4 See McDougal & Lasswell, "The Identification and Approval of Diverse Sys-
tems of Public Order," 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1959); Dession, "The Technique of Public
Order: Evolving Concepts of Criminal Law," 5 Buffalo L. Rev. 22 (1955).
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health, safety and comfort are encouraged to nurture private initia-
tive within a public framework designed to improve the shareable
level of enjoyment.
3.
These brief indications of the meaning of public and legal order
enable us to be more definite about the many points at which psy-
chiatric conceptions, methods and findings enter into the purview of
jurisprudence. Since jurisprudence is concerned with the decision
process, it is pertinent to suggest how psychiatry contributes to our
understanding of all decision functions.
Consider the intelligence function. Can psychiatry help to answer
who shall decide what information is obtained and disseminated in
the body politic? In general, it is clear that our goal is to leave these
activities in the hands of private media of communication. But is it
necessary to leave psychiatrically ill or handicapped people in charge
of, or with ready access to, channels of such vital importance to
sound judgment on public affairs? From psychiatry we are obtaining
tools of diagnosis which can be applied to help ascertain the magnitude
of the problem.
Connected with the intelligence function are those who, acting
to further the legitimate goal of national security, perform the censor-
ship or the official propaganda role, engage in espionage and counter-
espionage in military matters, or act as agents in obtaining "political
police" types of intelligence; that is, information on the basis of
which judgments of "loyalty" or "disloyalty" can be made. Should
these operations be in the hands of psychiatrically ill or handicapped
individuals? Here again the magnitude of the problem is capable of
being discovered by using the tools of psychiatry.
Corresponding questions arise in regard to the recommending
function. Our goal is freedom of individual and organized advocacy
of recommended courses of public action. But does this make it
necessary to permit psychiatrically ill or handicapped persons to
organize and direct political parties and pressure groups, or to obtain
access to public forums in order to propose or try to incite action?
We face similar problems if we consider the prescribing function.
Our democratic objective signifies that we are in favor of wide par-
ticipation. However, are we bound to permit psychiatrically ill and
handicapped persons to vote in candidate and issue elections? To run
for an office in a constitutional convention or a legislature? To con-
tinue in office?
If we think of the invoking function our democratic goal suggests
that the door shall be wide open in the recruitment of personnel to
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acquire the technical skill needed. But is it required of democracies
that they shall allow psychiatrically ill or handicapped persons to be-
come policemen and prosecutors?
The application function includes the final assessment of conduct
according to the existing code of prescription. Are we committed by
our democratic goal to permit judges, juries, administrative com-
missions, and officials in the defense and civil services to include the
psychiatrically ill and handicapped?
The appraisal function has to do with the relation between pol-
icy goal and the steps undertaken up to date to accomplish these
goals. Appraisals include the examination of legislative and admin-
istrative measures, for instance, and the assessment of their efficacy.
Does democratic theory require that we allow the psychiatrically ill
and handicapped to operate as auditors and inspectors?
The terminating function puts an end to prescriptions and ar-
rangements made under their authorization. This function usually has
fewer specialized organs than the other functions, although many arbi-
tration, mediation and conciliation agreements provide for special
machinery. Our question is whether democratic theory requires that
we permit psychiatrically ill or handicapped individuals to take these
roles?
4.
The foregoing problems relate to various phases of the decision
process in a given public order context. However, the scope of juris-
prudential curiosity is in no sense restricted to these decision phases.
It is necessary to evaluate the degree to which other-than-govern-
mental activities are carried out in harmony with the overriding goals
of the community.
When we look into practices that are regarded as "economic," for
example, it is not uncommon to find "bottlenecks" of influence whose
social consequences are especially important. The leadership of large
corporations and trade unions, for instance, come in this category. If
we are to remain consistent with our basic goal must we acquiesce
when key spots are occupied by psychiatrically ill or handicapped
persons?
Corresponding queries are appropriately raised in reference to
all the remaining value-institution processes in a given social context.
Such questions have frequently been asked regarding family institu-
tions: e.g., must believers in private initiative adopt the claim that
they must approve marital and sexual relationships when psychiatri-
cally ill and handicapped persons are involved?
We shall not pursue this tentative inventory further. It has
served its purpose if it has made our position more definite that juris-
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prudence has much to learn from the use of psychiatric means of dis-
covering the presence of psychiatrically ill and handicapped individ-
uals in various spots throughout the entire context of a given society.
5.
Although it is important to discover the facts concerning the dis-
tribution of psychiatrically ill and handicapped persons throughout
the decision and other social processes, we are unable to evaluate the
data until a further set of facts is obtained: Is the presence of a
psychiatrically ill or handicapped person destructive to him or to
others? In a word, are the goal values of the public order system
damaged or threatened? To what extent? In regard to which values
and practices?
Consider, for example, the incidence of psychiatric illness or
handicap at any given section in time in the U.S. among individuals
over 21 years of age and who now have, or might have, the right of
access to the electorate in elections for federal and other offices. At
present we are surprisingly uninformed about aggregate figures, al-
though rough estimates can be made according to accepted categories
of illness and defect.' A comprehensive inquiry would ask whether
psychiatric diagnosis bears any ascertainable relation to the capability
of individuals to perform a specified minimum of participation in elec-
tions. By specified minimum we mean a standard that has been laid
down by public authorities or that is stated by the scientific observer
for the purpose of narrowing his research and making it most pertinent
to policy alternatives.
Creative work in jurisprudence would seek to formulate such
minimum standards and to obtain research estimates of the impact
of "psychiatric variables" upon "political participation variables."6
Existing official specifications of minimum level are exceedingly vague,
and must for the most part be inferred from the qualifications laid
down for voting or citizenship. But it is possible to set up "hypo-
thetical standards" by taking into consideration our basic goal of
human dignity and the practices which are current in a given context.
Human dignity implies, for example, that individual freedom of
choice is to receive the fullest opportunity for expression compatible
with the freedom of choice of others. A key question then is: Do the
psychiatric variables so modify individual freedom of choice that the
5 See Leighton, Clausen, & Wilson, Explorations in Social Psychiatry (1957)
especially Chapter 9 by Gruenberg & Bellin.
6 A valuable summary of present knowledge is Lane, Political Life: Why People
Get Involved in Politics (1959) especially Chapter 9, "How Are Unconscious Needs
Expressed in Politics?"
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person (or category of persons) is unable to participate as a member
of the electorate at any specified level of performance? Further, if
the individual (or category) does participate, what differences does it
make? For instance, do hospitalization and other therapeutic prac-
tices operate so effectively that persons are withdrawn from active
participation with no need of exclusion from voting? In view of the
size of electorates shall we say that psychiatric variables have not had
a significant impact upon the electoral outcome, hence can be disre-
garded?
The previous queries ask about past and present events as de-
scribed by dependable information regarding trends in the magnitude
of the variables in which we are interested and the weight of these
variables as they condition one another. (The question about "hos-
pitalization," for example, asks about conditioning and also about
trends.)
We must go further and consider future events involving the
variables with which we are concerned. Assuming that no official
policies are changed what projections are probable? Will hospital-
ization, e.g., increase and further diminish any adverse results of
permitting participation?
Finally, we ask about alternative policies in regard to the future.
At what cost in terms of man-hours spent in research and promotional
activity, or in enforcement, can various policy purposes be obtained
(such as disqualification of voters with given clinical diagnoses)?
6.
The last question cannot be satisfactorily answered without much
more detailed policy specification than has been discussed thus far.
Assuming for the moment that the case has been made for a con-
siderable degree of destructiveness in the past and (barring policy
change) in the future, what policy alternatives are to be evaluated
and in what terms? All policies, past and potential, must be made
specific in terms of who is authorized to decide what using what pro-
cedure. More detailed delineation of the "who" calls for the specifica-
tion of qualifications, modes of selection, and methods of personnel
management.7 It is also necessary to spell out jurisdiction according
to the domain, scope and range of values and institutions; and to
describe procedures according to the strategies available for using the
base values at the disposal of decision makers.
7 Concerning the manner of man who becomes a judge in our civilization and the
interplay of unconscious factors in the judicial process reference can be made to the
early work of F. Alexander and his lawyer colleague, Staub, The Criminal, The Judge,
and The Public (1956); and the penetrating observations scattered among the writ-
ings of the late Judge Jerome Frank.
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When policy alternatives are defined it is feasible to begin a new
search of the past for comparable situations and to mobilize methods
and experts to obtain estimates of future costs and gains in terms of
all pertinent values.
7.
We may have implied-although we do not desire to pre-judge
the result-that the careful study of psychiatric variables affecting
membership in the electorate may lead to the recommendation of "no
policy change." Such an outcome is much less thinkable if we consider
the probable result of studying the role of psychiatric factors which
affect the possible disqualification of legislators, chief executives, de-
fense officials, civil administrators, judges, and other decision makers
at other phases of the deciding process.
Large as these questions are they in nowise exhaust the issues
within the decision process which jurisprudence can hope to clarify
in some degree with psychiatric knowledge. Another set of problems
has to do with the discovery of deviation from the prescribed norms
of the system of public order and the use of sanctions or corrective
measures in regard to responsible or threatening deprivers.
A typical task of judicial tribunals confronted by conflicting
claims of parties is to decide whether a situation existed or exists in
which a deviation from community prescriptions occurred. Besides
inflicting a deprivation upon all who are identified with the prescrip-
tion, the situation also typically contains persons who claim that they
suffered loss or were blocked from gain (or were or are threatened
with such deprivations). The losses or gains may be in terms of
wealth, power, respect, well-being, affection, rectitude, enlightenment
or skill.
From the standpoint of a jurisprudence of human dignity those
persons who exercise their freedom of choice to seek the net gains
which they expect to obtain by taking a chance and violating com-
munity prescriptions are responsible deviants (deprivers). They are
liable to the sanctioning measures prescribed by the community since
they are able to choose or to reject conformity. Primary and sanc-
tioning prescriptions are laid down by the community as a means of
influencing the conduct of all who have had at least a standard
minimum opportunity (and capability) to learn the patterns of the
value and institutional system which is sought to be protected by the
legal system.
Psychiatric knowledge has had an especially strong impact in
connection with conceptions of responsibility and with procedures by
which deprivers are sorted out and dealt with. Psychiatric knowledge
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shows that often, though not invariably, those who are psychiatrically
ill or handicapped are among the deprivers largely as a consequence
of psychiatric variables. To the degree that psychopathological var-
iables dominate, the individual is acting without freedom of choice
and cannot be regarded as responsible from the standpoint of a public
order of human dignity. To the extent that such individuals threaten
to be deprivers of themselves or others they are corrective problems
and liable to appropriate measures. Corrective measures aim, at re-
storing or bringing the individual's freedom of choice to at least the
minimum level that enables one to participate in the culture of a body
politic.,
8.
It was asserted above that the most important effect of psychiatry
has been procedural. We emphasized the point that psychiatric var-
iables vary in degree of impairment of freedom of choice pertaining
to past or prospective deprivations contrary to public order prescrip-
tions. Who shall decide?
The fundamental principle is plain enough: The authorized de-
cision makers of the legal system. There has, however, been great
confusion in the procedures whereby the decision makers have brought
to their attention the factual statements, predictions and forecasts of
qualified psychiatrists and other specialists. The chief confusion has
arisen from failure to understand the questions that can be put to
the psychiatrist without asking him to abandon his role as a physician
and to infringe upon the role proper to the decision maker, whether
judge or jury.
Part of this confusion regarding proper questions comes from
failure to perceive that the legalistic language to be applied by the
community decision maker is best applied when it is not used to inter-
togate psychiatrists. Legalistic terminology may employ such expres-
sions as "insane," "of unsound mind," "knowledge of right and
wrong." It is not the role of the psychiatrist to use this mode of
thought or talk; and the judge who couches questions to a psychiatrist
in these terms, or who allows such terms to be employed in addressing
a psychiatrist, or in the testimony of psychiatrists, is both confused,
and confounding confusion.
The psychiatrist can be helpful to the court if he seeks to make
clear in his own language, or in the language common to the culture,
whether an individual is psychiatrically ill or handicapped, or was at a
specified past time. He can be asked to explain how psychopatholog-
8 See Lasswell & Donnelly, "The Continuing Debate Over Responsibility: An
Introduction to Isolating the Condemnation Sanction," 68 Yale L. J. 869 (1959).
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ical variables typically affect the conduct of individuals under specified
types of circumstances. The circumstances referred to can be sug-
gested by past situations involving the defendant, or by situations in
which he may possibly be thrown in the future. Psychiatric general-
izations, like all scientific generalizations, take the form of "if, then"
statements of probability. It is not appropriate to ask the psychiatrist
to make a forecast of how the defendant will act under hypothetical
conditions-whether, for example, he will attempt to kill, himself or
someone else. The task of estimating the future of specific individuals
is properly within the sphere of the decision maker who has the ben-
efit of several sources of information about past incidents and the
current state of scientific predictions. On the last point-the current
state of psychiatric generalization-it is always useful to obtain from
the psychiatrist an estimate of the degree to which, in his judgment,
there is professional consensus, or a high degree of experimental (or
other) confirmation.
In the United States, progress is being made in avoiding the con-
fusions that arise when incorrect questions are asked or when the
double language point is overlooked in the phraseology of questions.
Progress is also occurring in another procedural matter. "Sentenc-
ing" is often separated from the initial determination of what we here
call responsibility or, in the case of a non-responsible defendant, of a
threatening depriver. In the former case sanctioning measures are
indicated; in the latter, corrective measures. The decision makers, the
types of relevant testimony, and procedures can wisely vary between
the two sets of problems.
9.
By this time it is perhaps apparent that while psychiatry has
affected jurisprudential conceptions and methods, this impact is far
from exhaustive of the possibilities. We have scanned a few problems
relating to the decision process itself; and there remains the task of
examining the entire social process for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the destructive impact of psychopathological variables is suf-
ficient to justify new community prescriptions.
The decision process itself has been far from exhaustively cov-
ered even by implication. For example, we have had nothing to say
about the special problems of converting military arenas into civic
arenas by policies which are chiefly persuasive rather than coercive.
This is the distinctive problem of public order in the world arena as
a whole. Psychiatric investigations have abundantly documented the
point that unconscious predispositions in a group need not dominate
conduct in a given situation unless certain environmental factors are
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also present. Personalities not only possess unconscious drives to
sweep aside all authoritative restraint, they also include such auto-
matic structures as the "super ego" (conscience), which typically
operate to hold rebelliousness or active aggression in check. The in-
ternal checks are dissolved or broken through under crisis conditions
in which the conscience is "divided against itself," half supporting and
half inhibiting the expression of destructive drives. Hence psychiatric
views of personality confirm in part the traditional wisdom of many
schools of jurisprudence who see in the perfecting of institutional
practice the ultimate safeguard against breaches of public order.
Where the practices are non-existent or vague and contradictory the
forecast is clear: Under crisis conditions the mounting stress within
and among participants increases the probability of active coercion.
This point has been made in detail by Ranyard West for the
world community as a whole. But a more challenging problem is what
light psychiatry throws upon the policies to use in seeking to trans-
form the military into a civic arena. Without pursuing the analysis
in this place we can at least emphasize the suggestiveness of psy-
chiatric analysis and procedures for the reduction of tension in in-
dividuals and groups. We speak of this as the strategy of catharsis.
There is also the strategy of piecemeal change or reform; and, finally,
the exceedingly doubtful and dangerous strategy of wholesale or revo-
lutionary reconstruction, where the difficulties of keeping control of
events has hitherto proved to be insurmountable.
This much is very clear: If human beings are to participate in
the decision process with optimum rationality a level of activation is
required that is sufficient to sustain attention without allowing stresses
to accumulate to the point that renders discussion and agreement
impossible.
The future effect of psychiatry upon jurisprudence will be greatly
facilitated by the perfecting of an appraisal function that keeps all
who share in the decision process informed of the changing distribu-
tion of psychopathological factors throughout the world arena, to-
gether with an estimate of the extent to which these factors condition
destructive effects. In the light of such "trend" and "condition"
knowledge it will be possible to "project" the future on the assumption
of no change of policy, and also to evaluate the probable effect of
alternative policies upon the maximization of the goals of the pre-
ferred system of public order.
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